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	Judicial	Decision-Making	within	Political	Parties:		A	Political	Approach	
	
Abstract:		
How	 do	 German	 intra-party	 tribunals	 manage	 internal	 conflicts?	 More	 specifically,	 why	 do	 they	
accept	some	cases	for	trial	but	reject	others?	Required	by	law	to	strictly	adhere	to	procedural	rules,	
German	 intra-party	 tribunals	 are	 designed	 to	 insulate	 conflict	 regulation	 from	politics.	Meanwhile	
research	on	 judicial	politics	highlights	the	role	of	political	and	strategic	considerations	 in	accepting	
cases	 for	 trial.	We	develop	 a	 theory	 that	 emphasizes	 tribunal's	 political	 concerns	 such	 as	winning	
elections	 that	 go	beyond	procedural	 considerations.	We	 test	 our	 hypotheses	with	 a	mixed-effects	
logit	model	 on	 a	novel	 data	 set	 covering	1088	 tribunal	 decisions	 in	 six	German	parties	 from	1967	
until	 2015.	 Our	 findings	 indicate	 that	 political	 factors	 exert	 a	 strong	 effect	 on	 tribunal	 case	
acceptance.	 Tribunals	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 accept	 cases	 after	 losing	 votes	 and	 government	 office.	
Moreover,	 they	 dismiss	 cases	 more	 easily	 when	 their	 parties	 display	 relatively	 high	 policy	
agreement.	
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The	ability	of	parties	to	manage	and	ultimately	resolve	internal	conflict	is	not	only	vital	for	
their	organizational	survival	but	also	to	fulfill	their	functions	within	the	political	system.	To	
do	so,	parties	adopt	different	kinds	of	conflict	regulation	mechanisms	that	can	range	from	
hierarchical	mechanisms	controlled	by	the	party	leadership	to	non-hierarchical	mechanisms	
controlled	by	actors	independent	of	the	leadership		(Bolleyer	et	al.	2017:	836).	Despite	the	
growing	literature	dealing	with	different	sources	of	party	conflict1,	we	know	only	little	about	
the	nature	of	procedures	that	organizations	adopt	to	address	this	important	challenge	on	a	
day	to	day	basis.2	This	paper	investigates	one	important	type	of	procedure,	namely	German	
intra-party	tribunals,	quasi-judicial	bodies	established	within	party	organizations	to	resolve	
internal	 disputes	 and	 designed	 to	 mirror	 national	 legal	 structures.	 In	 order	 to	 function	
effectively,	 they	 are	 supposed	 to	 be	 neutral,	 independent	 and	 fair.3	 Indeed	 parties	 often	
claim	to	emulate	these	norms	in	their	conflict	regulation	procedures,	yet	as	Rahat	points	out	
“…these	organs	are	suspected	(often	with	reason)	of	being	partial."	 (2013:	141).	Concerns	
about	 the	 impartiality	 of	 judicial	 bodies	 derives	 from	 a	 long	 literature	 on	 the	 partisan	
leanings	of	 state	and	national	courts	 in	 the	United	States	 (Hein	and	Ewert	2016;	Kastellec	
and	Lax	2008),	which	provides	strong	evidence	that	political	factors	affect	the	decisions	of	
state	courts,	with	 important	repercussions	for	the	operation	of	these	bodies	 in	 intra-party	
settings.		
This	 paper	 takes	 a	 step	 back	 and	 investigates	 the	 importance	 of	 political	
considerations	 in	the	decisions	of	tribunals	to	accept	or	reject	cases.	Evidence	of	 impartial	
judgments	may	mask	 legally	 neutral	 tribunals’	 avoidance	 of	 politically	 sensitive	 cases	 ‘on	
formal	grounds'.	Our	 theoretical	argument	proposes	 that	party	 tribunals	 indeed	accept	or	
reject	 cases	 in	 line	 with	 “their	 political	 preferences	 or	 considerations	 regarding	 political	
appropriateness”	 (Hein	 and	 Ewert	 2014:	 70).	 Specifically,	 we	 link	 the	 likelihood	 of	 case	
acceptance	 to	 the	 core	 partisan	 goals	 of	 vote	 maximization,	 policy	 implementation	 and	
																																								 																				
1	See,	for	instance,	work	on	factionalism	by	Boucek	2009;	2012	or	Zariskia	1965;	on	the	internal	dynamics	in	
and	evolution	of	new	parties	by	Art	2011;	Bolleyer	2013;	Mudde	2007;	or	Müller-Rommel	and	Poguntke	2002	
or	on	intra-party	conflict	linked	to	government	participation	and	intra-party	democracy,	Bäck	2008;	
Deschouwer	2008;	Giannetti	and	Benoit	2008;	Maor	1992;	Scarrow	2005	or	Seeleib-Kaiser	2010.	
2	But	see	Gherghina	2014;	Smith	and	Gauja	2010;	Bolleyer	et	al	2017.	
3	Independent	tribunals	are	not	only	common	in	democracies	where	they	are	required	by	law	such	as	
Germany,	Czech	Republic,	Romania	and	Portugal	(Biezen	and	Piccio	2003).	We	also	find	them	in	countries	such	
as	Norway	and	UK	where	intra-party	matters	are	not	made	subject	to	legal	regulation	(Bolleyer	at	al	2018).	
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office	holding	(Müller	and	Strøm	1999).	Our	theoretical	framework	provides	insight	into	the	
extent	to	which	tribunals	use	their	power	to	advance	central	party	goals	rather	than	act	as	
neutral	 dispute	 regulation	 mechanism	 even	 in	 settings	 where	 neutral	 decision-making	 is	
legally	prescribed.	
	
The	German	case	provides	a	crucial	advantage	to	a	systematic	analysis	of	our	framework:	all	
aspects	 of	 party	 tribunals	 are	 highly	 regulated	 by	 the	 German	 Party	 Law	 of	 1967,	 which	
makes	Germany	a	least	likely	case	to	find	politicized	judicial	decision-making	in	intra–party	
settings	and	therefore	constitutes	a	‘hard	case’	to	test	our	framework.	If	we	find	politicized	
judicial	decision-making	in	the	highly	regulated	context	of	Germany	it	is	highly	likely	to	play	
an	even	stronger	 role	 in	 less	 regulated	 intra-party	dispute	mechanisms.	Analyzing	 tribunal	
decisions	across	 six	parties	and	over	nearly	 five	decades,	our	 findings	 support	our	 central	
theoretical	argument	that	German	party	tribunals	follow	a	political	logic	when	they	consider	
whether	 to	 accept	 or	 reject	 cases.	 First,	 the	 greater	 the	 gains	 parties	 made	 at	 the	 last	
election,	and	hence	 the	 stronger	 their	position	 towards	 internal	 challenges,	 the	 less	 likely	
cases	are	to	be	accepted.	Second,	tribunals	operating	 in	parties	that	are	programmatically	
highly	 coherent	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 accept	 cases	 submitted	 to	 them.	 Third,	 if	 a	 party	 lost	
government	 (weakening	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 party	 to	 downplay	 conflict),	 tribunals	 are	more	
permissive	in	the	approval	of	cases.		
This	study	makes	three	main	contributions	to	existing	research	that	go	beyond	the	
direct	insights	of	our	analysis.	First,	previous	studies	considered	the	impact	of	party	goals	on	
outcomes	such	as	coalition	formation	(see	Pedersen	2012)	but,	 to	our	knowledge,	did	not	
apply	 them	 to	questions	of	 intra-party	 conflict	 regulation.	Our	 approach	 thus	 investigates	
the	role	of	party	goals	in	a	new	area.	Second,	the	study	of	intra-party	tribunals,	which	allow	
both	party	elites	and	ordinary	members	to	initiate	cases,	is	insightful	for	the	understanding	
of	conflict	regulation	outside	traditional	hierarchical	mechanisms	controlled	by	party	elites	
that	 impose	solutions	on	actors	and	procedurally	privilege	one	group	of	 intra-party	actors	
over	others.	Third,	our	 research	also	has	 important	normative	 repercussions.	Research	on	
intra-party	 democracy	 have	 focused	 on	 ‘electoral	 mechanisms'	 (e.g.	 primaries)	 at	 the	
expense	of	its	legal	foundations,	which	is	why	intra-organizational	mechanisms	established	
by	parties	to	protect	their	members'	rights	remain	widely	understudied	(but	see	Biezen	and	
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Piccio	 2013;	 Bolleyer	 et	 al	 2015).	 Our	 findings	 not	 only	 undermine	 assumptions	 on	 the	
neutrality	of	 tribunal	decision-making	but	also	 raise	 the	question	whether	 it	 is	possible	 to	
effectively	 transplant	court	structures	 into	political	parties	as	 tribunals’	positive	effects	on	
intra-party	democracy	and	the	electoral	aims	of	parties	are	often	difficult	to	reconcile.	
	
1.	Politicization	of	Judicial	Decision-Making	
	
An	increasing	number	of	political	scientists	(Stone	Sweet	2000)	and	legal	scholars	(Hein	and	
Ewert	2016;	Kastellec	and	Lax	2008)	study	the	politicization	of	judicial	processes	such	as	the	
appointment	 of	 judges	 and	 judicial	 review.	 In	 contrast,	 whether	 or	 not	 political	
considerations	affect	 the	 initial	 selection	of	cases	by	 tribunals	have	received	 less	scholarly	
attention	despite	generally	low	acceptance	rates	in	many	legal	systems	(Mak	2015).	Existing	
literature	on	case	acceptance	argues	 that	court	decisions	generally	are	 (co)determined	by	
political	 influences	 such	 as	 judges'	 political	 party	 affiliation,	 policy	 preferences	 (Hein	 and	
Ewert	2016;	Zorn	and	Bowie	2010;)	and	electoral	politics	(Joondeph	2008).	In	a	classic	study,	
Sheldon	 (1970)	 describes	 judges	 as	 'politicians	 in	 robes'	 that	 do	 not	 systematically	 differ	
from	other	political	actors.	Politicized	courts	sort	cases	into	acceptable	and	non-acceptable	
piles	 before	 even	 scheduling	 a	 hearing	 in	 clear	 opposition	 to	 the	 purely	 formal	 and	
procedural	grounds	on	which	case	acceptance	or	rejection	should	be	based	(Provine	1980:	
15).	
Intra-party	tribunals	 in	charge	of	resolving	conflicts	between	party	members,	often	
claim	 to	 emulate	 both	 the	 legal	 and	 supposedly	 neutral	 norms	 and	 procedures	 of	 public	
courts.	 Even	 when	 party	 statutes	 severely	 restrict	 tribunals’	 leeway	 to	 reject	 cases	
compared	 to	 public	 courts,	we	nevertheless	 expect	 that	 intra-party	 tribunals	 are	 similarly	
influenced	by	a	political	rather	than	a	purely	legal	calculus	when	deciding	whether	to	accept	
or	reject	cases.	Further	even	if	members	of	the	party	tribunal	might	be	banned	from	holding	
any	 additional	 party	office,	 they	 still	 have	a	 vested	 interest	 in	 the	 success	 and	 survival	 of	
their	 organization.	 Thus,	 the	question	 remains	 if	 Joondeph’s	 (2008:	 348)	 observation	 that	
the	 “determinants	 of	 judicial	 decisions,	 law	 and	 politics	 are	 in	many	 respects	 inextricably	
intertwined”	also	holds	in	intra-party	settings.	
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2.	A	Political	Account	of	 Tribunal	Decision-Making:	 The	 Importance	of	Votes,	Policy	and	
Office	
	
We	propose	a	new	framework	on	tribunal	decision-making	based	on	the	three	main	party	
goals	 of	 vote,	 policy	 implementation	 and	 office	 identified	 by	 Müller	 and	 Strøm	 (1999).	
Whereas	 some	 scholars	 stress	 trade-offs	 between	 the	 three	 goals	 parties	 usually	 pursue	
them	simultaneously	(Müller	and	Strøm:	12)	and	design	their	internal	organization	towards	
realizing	 these	 three	 goals	 (Harmel	 and	 Janda	 1994;	 Borz	 and	 Janda	 2018).	 Independent	
tribunals	are	supposed	to	solve	intra-party	conflict	without	being	affected	by	these	strategic	
party	goals	and	thus	their	decisions	might	challenge	if	not	undermine	the	party’s	peruse	of	
these	goal	at	times	if	the	party	regulations	requires	it.	In	contrast,	our	theoretical	argument	
emphasizes	that	even	if	tribunals	are	designed	to	be	independent,	by	strategically	accepting	
or	rejecting	cases,	can	be	directed	towards	the	implementation	of	party	goals	and	thereby	
contribute	to	organizational	stability.	We	outline	how	each	goal	imposes	its	own	constraints	
on	the	decision-making	processes	of	the	tribunals	at	different	times.	
	
Vote	Maximization	and	the	Bypassing	of	Conflict	
	
The	first	goal	that	motivates	parties’	behavior	is	vote	maximization	with	the	aim	to	receive	
more	 votes	 than	 the	 other	 parties	 and	 thus	 win	 elections	 (Müller	 and	 Strøm	 1999:	 8).	
Achieving	 this	 goal	 is	 also	 vital	 to	 achieving	 the	 other	 two	 goals	 of	 policy	 and	 office.	
Therefore	 parties	 are	 most	 likely	 to	 reform	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 policy,	 personnel	 and	
organization	if	they	underperformed	in	the	latest	election	(Janda	1990:	5;	Harmel	and	Janda,	
1994).	We	can	expect	political	pressures	resulting	from	electoral	underperformance	to	also	
affect	how	tribunals	deal	with	cases	submitted	to	them.	These	periods	often	involve	debates	
around	 how	 internal	 processes	 (do	 or	 should)	 work,	 how	 decisions	 are	 made	 and	 what	
explained	the	vote	loss.	It	becomes	difficult	for	the	weakened	party	to	downplay	or	ignore	
conflict	 and	mirroring	 the	 readiness	 to	 give	 in	 to	 demands	 of	 intra-organizational	 reform	
party	elites	–	including	tribunal	members	-	might	also	be	more	permissive	in	the	handling	of	
the	conflict.	This	suggests	that	after	a	loss	of	seats	during	elections,	more	cases	should	make	
it	through	the	approval	stage	of	intra-party	tribunals.	
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H1.1	 (Vote	Gain	Hypothesis):	 	Tribunals	are	more	 likely	to	accept	cases	the	more	a	party’s	
electoral	performance	declines.		
	
Theorizing	 the	 repercussions	 of	 parties’	 vote	 aspirations,	 the	 timing	 of	 when	 intra-party	
conflict	 is	 handled	 is	 important.	 Clarke	 (2013)	 distinguishes	 between	 intra-party	 conflict	
occurring	 over	 the	 entire	 inter-electoral	 period	 and	 conflict	 that	 occurs	 in	 the	 months	
immediately	 prior	 to	 election	 day.	 With	 regard	 to	 the	 latter,	 he	 argues	 that	 the	 closer	
parties	get	to	the	next	election	the	more	likely	they	are	to	draw	the	media’s	spotlight	and	
thus	want	to	present	themselves	as	unified.	Furthermore,	conflict	closer	to	election	day	will	
be	recalled	by	voters	when	going	to	the	polls	(Clark	2013).	This	is	underlined	by	Traber	et	al	
(2013:	194)	stating	that	“elections	are	likely	to	play	an	important	role	in	the	quest	for	party	
unity”.	Consequently,	the	portrayal	of	the	party	as	divided	can	have	a	negative	impact	on	its	
electoral	prospects,	which	is	why	tribunals	are	incentivized	to	avoid	dealing	with	cases	close	
to	election	day.	This	leads	to	our	second	hypothesis:	
	
H1.2	(Time	to	Election	Hypothesis)	Tribunals	are	less	likely	to	accept	cases	the	closer	the	
next	election.	
	
Policy:	Policy	Disagreement	and	Responsiveness	to	Intra-Party	Conflict	
	
One	of	the	main	goals	of	parties	is	to	maximize	its	impact	on	public	policy	(Müller	and	Strøm	
1999:	7).	But	in	order	to	do	so	effectively	they	need	to	present	a	coherent	set	of	policies,	as	
parties	that	appear	divided	over	policies	tend	to	lose	elections	(Greene	and	Haber	2014)	and	
are	less	likely	to	get	into	government	(Bäck	2008).	The	lack	of	a	clear	program	often	results	
from	the	lack	of	agreement	over	policy	that	might	separate	parties	into	competing	factions	
(see	for	example	the	fundi-realo	debate	in	the	German	Green	Party,	Burchcell	2002).	Lack	of	
agreement	has	repercussions	for	 intra-party	conflict	regulation.	Parties	need	to	find	a	way	
to	 internally	 absorb	 conflict	 resulting	 from	 policy	 disagreement	 before	 it	 affects	 their	
performance	 at	 the	 ballot	 box.	 The	more	 severely	 factions	 clash	 over	 policy	 and	 seek	 to	
weaken	their	opponents	by	formal	and	informal	means,	the	more	deeply	involved	tribunals	
become	in	managing	these	conflicts.	Thus,	in	parties	with	lower	policy	agreement	tribunals	
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play	a	key	role	 in	keeping	and	resolving	conflict	 internally	by	accepting	more	cases	before	
policy	clashes	negatively	affect	the	party’s	public	standing.	Conversely,	we	expect	tribunals	
operating	in	parties	with	high	policy	agreement	to	wield	greater	freedom	when	deciding	to	
ignore	 conflict	 to	 display	 an	 image	of	 unity	 to	 the	 outside	world.	 Tribunals	 of	 high	 policy	
agreement	parties	should	accept	fewer	cases:		
	
H2	 (Policy	Agreement	Hypothesis):	 Tribunals	 in	 parties	with	 high	 policy	 agreement	 accept	
fewer	cases	than	tribunals	in	parties	with	low	policy	agreement.	
	
Office:	Conflict	Regulation	Inside	and	Outside	Government	
	
The	 last	 goal	 of	 parties	 identified	 by	Müller	 and	 Strøm	 (1999:	 5)	 is	office.	 The	 successful	
holding	 of	 government	 office	 has	 important	 intra-organizational	 repercussions.	 When	 a	
government	party	is	busy	implementing	its	program,	its	attention	shifts	from	organizational	
matters	to	the	functioning	of	the	party	in	public	office	(Katz	and	Mair	1995).	Simultaneously,	
government	participation	often	brings	 its	 share	of	 frustration	 to	 those	 in	 the	organization	
not	 involved	 in	 governing	 themselves,	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 compromises	 necessary	 in	 policy-
making	 –	 especially	 in	 coalition	 governments	 –	 and	 the	 quite	 common	 decline	 in	 direct	
accountability	 of	 those	 running	 government	 to	 the	 organization	 outside	 (e.g.	 Müller-
Rommel	 and	 Poguntke	 2002).	 This	 can	 fuel	 internal	 conflict	 and	 enhance	 the	 need	 for	
conflict	 regulation	 in	 a	 period	 during	 which	 the	 public	 display	 of	 such	 conflict	 might	 be	
particularly	unwelcome.	Therefore,	while	 in	 the	government	a	party	might	be	keener	and	
more	able	to	downplay	or	ignore	internal	conflict	as	the	display	of	unity	is	more	important	
to	assure	the	party’s	ability	to	effectively	implement	its	program.	Here	tribunals	can	play	a	
crucial	role	in	supporting	this	display	of	unity	by	accepting	fewer	cases.	
	
H3.1	 (Government	 Party	 Hypothesis):	 Tribunals	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 accept	 cases	 when	 their	
party	is	in	government	than	when	it	is	in	opposition.	
	
As	 holding	 office	 raises	 incentives	 to	 downplay	 conflict,	 losing	 office	 usually	 triggers	
heightened	internal	debate	about	the	reasons	behind	the	setback	and	about	the	strategy	to	
regain	 governmental	 control.	 Courtney	 (1995:262)	 shows	 that	 party	 authority	 weakens	
8	
during	 opposition	 periods	 and	 intra-organizational	 challenges	 and	 reforms	 become	
particularly	likely.	For	parties	this	is	a	chance	for	renewal	(LeDuc	2001)	and	a	possibility	for	
the	 organization	 to	 reconnect	 with	 members	 and	 voters.	 These	 periods	 often	 include	
reforms	 that	 empower	 the	 members	 over	 party	 elites,	 which	 the	 latter	 might	 not	 have	
agreed	 to	 had	 they	 not	 lost	 office	 (Cross	 and	 Blais	 2012).	 Regarding	 conflict	 regulation,	
losing	 government	 office	 should	 therefore	 make	 the	 process	 of	 conflict	 regulation	 more	
permissive	and	improve	the	chances	for	a	case	to	be	accepted.	Consequently,	tribunals	are	
expected	to	accept	more	cases	because	the	party’s	move	to	opposition	weakens	their	ability	
to	downplay	conflict	as	party	unity	 is	 less	 central	and	opposition	parties	have	 less	 to	 lose	
than	governmental	ones.	
	
H3.2	 (Government	 Loss	Hypothesis):	 Tribunals	 are	more	 likely	 to	 accept	 a	 case	 after	 their	
party	has	lost	government	
	
3.	Germany	as	a	Least	Likely	Case	for	‘Tribunal	Politicization’	
When	 applying	 rule-of-law	 principles	 to	 intra-organizational	 settings	 (Agrast	 et	 al.	 2010),	
party	 tribunals	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 formally	 independent	 and	 equivalent	 to	 ‘state	 courts’	 if	
neither	party	members	in	public	office	nor	party	leaders	are	allowed	to	take	a	formal	role	in	
them.	Both	the	German	Party	Law	and	parties’	intra-organizational	rules	fit	this	description	
and	thereby	make	Germany	a	least	likely	case	for	finding	support	for	our	hypotheses.	If	we	
find	 politicized	 judicial	 decision-making	 in	 Germany,	 less	 regulated	 intra-party	 dispute	
mechanisms	are	even	more	likely	to	be	affected	by	similar	dynamics.	
The	 1967	 German	 Party	 Law	 requires	 tribunals	 to	 be	 independent	 and	 prohibits	
simultaneous	membership	on	a	tribunal	and	in	the	party	executive	(Biezen	and	Piccio	2013:	
39-40).	 In	 addition,	 German	 parties	 adopted	 intra-organizational	 rules	 that	 establish	 the	
incompatibility	 of	 tribunal	 membership	 with	 any	 party	 office	 (§14	 Abs	 2),4	 require	 the	
election	 of	 tribunal	 members	 at	 least	 every	 two	 or	 four	 years	 by	 the	 party	 congress,	
guarantee	the	right	to	replacement	of	a	judge	given	suspicion	of	bias	(§14	Abs	4),	and	oblige	
judges	 to	 recuse	 themselves	 in	 case	of	 any	 conflict	 of	 interest.	 Further	 the	party	 statutes	
																																								 																				
4This	also	includes	public	office,	central	office	and	any	employee	of	the	party	or	any	of	its	organs.	Further	they	
must	not	receive	a	salary	from	the	party	in	any	form	
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point	out	that	the	party	does	not	pay	judges	and	the	party	only	covers	judges’	expenses	(e.g.	
travel	 costs,	 accommodation	 and	 food)	 These	 regulations	 intend	 to	 ensure	 tribunals’	
neutrality	 and	 their	 efficient	 decision-making	 that	 should	 be	 unaffected	 by	 political	
influences,	strategic	considerations	or	other	sources	of	bias	unrelated	to	the	nature	of	the	
case.5	 The	 only	 criteria	 by	 which	 tribunals	 decide	 to	 accept	 or	 reject	 cases	 should	 be	
procedural.		
Germany’s	strict	 legal	environment	 is	particularly	 relevant	 in	 the	acceptance	stage.	
Party	statutes	clearly	outline	and	limit	the	possibilities	for	tribunals	to	reject	a	case	without	
opening	a	hearing,	and	 initiators	can	challenge	the	tribunal’s	decision	to	reject	a	case	and	
request	a	reassessment.	German	tribunals	can	use	three	main	but	narrowly	circumscribed	
justifications	 to	 reject	 a	 case:	 formal	 mistakes,	 cases	 outside	 tribunal's	 jurisdiction,	 and	
cases	without	merit.	First,	rejecting	cases	due	to	formal	mistakes	usually	result	from	missing	
official	deadlines	or	from	providing	incomplete	claims.	Second,	tribunals	reject	cases	if	the	
plaintiff’s	 claim	 lies	 outside	 its	 jurisdiction	 or	 the	 plaintiff	 did	 not	 follow	 the	 correct	 legal	
path	 through	 lower-level	 tribunals.	 Third,	 tribunals	 perceive	 the	 plaintiff’s	 claim	 to	 be	
without	 merit	 as	 they	 see	 no	 legal	 basis	 for	 the	 complaints	 in	 the	 party	 statutes	 or	 the	
plaintiffs	 fail	 to	 clearly	 justify	 the	 legal	 basis	 of	 their	 complaint.	 Particularly,	 tribunals’	
leeway	in	interpreting	the	merit	of	claims	opens	up	space	for	political	considerations.		
	
Covering	 all	 main	 parties	 constituting	 the	 German	 party	 system	 over	 an	 extensive	 time	
period	has	several	methodological	advantages	regarding	our	ability	to	test	our	hypotheses	
due	 to	 the	 composition	 of	 the	 resulting	 sample	 of	 tribunal	 decisions	 and	 the	 contextual	
conditions	 in	which	these	decisions	were	made	(Slater	and	Ziblatt	2013:	1311-13).	Neither	
the	1967	Party	Law	nor	the	parties’	statutes	implementing	it	have	made	significant	changes	
since	 its	 introduction,	 providing	 constant	 core	 procedural	 requirements	 for	 tribunals’	
decisions	 overtime	 and	 across	 parties.	 As	 our	 parties	 cover	 a	 wide	 spectrum	 of	 intra-
organizational	decision-making	cultures,	we	therefore	also	cover	a	wide	a	variety	of	tribunal	
submissions.	This	variation	enhances	our	sample’s	representativeness	regarding	the	types	of	
																																								 																				
5	 A	 “party	 tribunal”	 for	 conflict	 regulation	 that	 is	 chaired	 by	 the	 party	 leader	 or	 run	 by	 members	 of	 the	
executive	would	not	qualify	as	the	equivalent	of	a	“court”	since	it	lacks	formal	independence	from	those	who	
hold	core	powers	in	the	party.	Such	structures	would	qualify	as	hierarchical	and	leadership	controlled	instead	
(see	Bolleyer	et	al.	2017).	
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conflicts	 parties	 experience	 and	 the	 diverse	 strategies	 of	 dealing	 with	 them.	 Analyzing	 a	
broad	 and	 representative	 sample	 is	 particularly	 important,	 as	 existing	 research	 tends	 to	
focus	on	conflict	and	its	regulation	in	particular	arenas	(e.g.	government	coalitions).	Broader	
studies	of	party	conflict	tend	to	focus	on	particularly	visible	cases	of	conflict	within	new	or	
highly	 factionalized	 parties,	 which	 are	 unlikely	 to	 be	 representative	 of	 day-to-day	 intra-
organizational	conflict	 regulation	 in	mainstream	parties.6	This	 is	problematic	as	 intra-party	
conflict	and	how	parties	deal	with	it	tends	to	be	problematized	in	the	media	as	reporting	in	
the	 German	 local	 and	 national	 print	media	 illustrates.7	 Finally,	 tribunal	 documentation	 is	
available	 for	 an	 ideologically	 diverse	 set	 of	 parties	 up	 to	 a	 48-year	 period	 (1967–2015).	
During	 this	 period	 parties	 joined	 and	 left	 national	 government,	 experienced	 electoral	
victories	and	defeats	and	 repeatedly	 revised	 their	party	programs,	allowing	us	 to	 test	 the	
influence	of	the	core	variables	in	our	theoretical	framework	across	parties	and	over	time.		
	
4.	Data,	Coding	and	Measurement	
	
Our	analysis	covers	all	 cases	of	parliamentary	parties'	national	 tribunals	decided	since	 the	
introduction	 of	 the	 1967	 German	 Party	 Law	 until	 2015.8	 Tribunal	 documentation	 about	
cases	in	the	Greens,	CDU,	CSU,	SPD	and	FDP	was	compiled	by	the	Institut	für	Deutsches	und	
Internationales	Parteienrecht	und	Parteienforschung	(PRuF)	at	the	University	of	Dusseldorf.9	
Tribunal	 documentation	 for	 the	 Left	 Party	was	 taken	 from	 its	 own	website.10	To	 test	 our	
																																								 																				
6	Prominent	examples	are	the	Dutch	List	Pim	Fortuyn	(Reuter	2009;	de	Lange	and	Art	2011),	New	Democracy	in	
Sweden	(Aylott	1995;	Bale	and	Blomgren	2008;	Jungar	2013),	the	Spanish	UCD	(Gunther	and	Hopkin	2002)	or	
the	Italian	Christian	Democrats	(Bardi	1996;	Boucek	2012	and	2009).	
7	See,	for	instance,	for	membership	exclusion:	Parteiausschlussverfahren:	So	funktioniert	der	Rauswurf,	Der	
Stern,	January	21	2008;	Wie	funktioniert	eigentlich	ein	Parteiausschluss?	Focus,	August	29	2010;	SPD	will	
Ausschlussverfahren	verkürzen,	Frankfurter	Allgemeine	Zeitung,	September	2	2010;	
Parteiausschlussverfahren:	Sarrazin	darf	in	der	SPD	bleiben,	Süddeutsche	Zeitung,	April	22	2011,	Edathy	
darf	in	der	SPD	bleiben,	Spiegel	Online	2016,	Februar	12	2016	
For	other	organisational	questions:	CDU	muss	Wahl	nicht	wiederholen,	Nordwest	Zeitung,	July	02	2005;	
Wahlanfechtung	scheitert	–	FDP	Schiedsgericht	erklärt	Stellvertreter-Wahl	aber	für	unzulässig,	Neue	Deister-
Zeitung,	November	12	2009;	Vorstands-Wahl	der	Wallerfanger	Linken	wird	wiederholt,	Saarbrücker	Zeitung,	
July	11	2010;	Intrigen	in	der	Duisburger	CDU,	Der	Westen,	April	14	2011;	Parteigericht:	Wahl	zum	AfD-
Vorstand	ist	doch	ungültig,	Berliner	Morgenpost,	Feburary	06	2017	
8	The	CDU,	SPD	and	FDP	existed	prior	to	1967.	Their	statutes	prior	to	the	law	show	that	party	tribunals	were	
already	part	of	their	repertoire	of	conflict	regulation	(Bolleyer	et	al	2018).	
9	 Institut	 für	 Deutsches	 und	 Internationales	 Parteienrecht	 und	 Parteienforschung	 Schiedsgerichtsurteile	 der	
obersten	Parteischiedsgerichte	(PRuF)	http://docserv.uni-duesseldorf.de/search/search-judgment.xml	
10	 Die	 Linke.	 Beschlüsse	 der	 Bundesschiedskommission	 http://www.die-linke.de/partei/weitere-
strukturen/gewaehlte-gremien/schiedskommission/beschluesse-der-bundesschiedskommission/	
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hypotheses,	we	created	a	new	dataset	based	on	the	tribunal	documentation	just	described.	
The	 high	 level	 of	 formalization	 and	 documentation	 of	 each	 tribunal	 case	 allowed	 for	
straightforward	and	unambiguous	coding	decisions.11		
	
Coding	 our	 dependent	 variable,	 whether	 a	 case	 was	 accepted	 or	 rejected,	 was	
straightforward	as	tribunals	have	to	provide	a	written	justification	of	each	rejection	to	the	
initiator,	 which	 explains	 which	 procedural	 requirement	 the	 claim	 did	 not	 fulfill.	 We	
identified	a	case	as	“rejected”	 if	 trial	documentation	highlighted	one	of	 the	 three	reasons	
discussed	above;	in	other	words,	when	tribunals	argued	that	a	claim	was	incomplete	(formal	
error),	 inadmissible	 (outside	 the	 tribunal’s	 jurisdiction),	or	without	 legal	merit.	Our	 results	
thus	indicate	why	tribunals	are	more	likely	accept,	or	conversely,	less	likely	to	reject	cases.	
	
To	test	our	 two	vote	 logic	hypotheses,	we	calculate	the	Vote	Loss	variable	on	the	basis	of	
the	ParlGov	database	 (Döring	and	Manow	2016)	by	 taking	 the	absolute	difference	 in	vote	
shares	in	the	past	two	elections.	For	example,	if	a	party	gains	20%	in	2013	and	25%	in	2010	
we	would	code	a	5%	vote	loss	for	all	cases	after	the	2013	election.	When	parties	gain	votes,	
we	code	a	zero.	Finally,	we	construct	Time	to	Election	variable	that	counts	the	days	until	the	
next	election.	It	reaches	(0)	on	the	day	of	the	election	and	is	reset	at	the	time	until	the	next	
election	approaches	on	the	day	after	the	election.	
		
Our	second	explanatory	variable,	Policy	Disagreement	(H2),	 is	Giebler	et	al’s	Programmatic	
Clarity	 (PC)	 Index	 (2015,	 2018),	 which	 builds	 on	 the	 Comparative	 Party	Manifesto	 (CMP)	
data	(Volkens	et	al	2016).	The	PC	index	captures	how	clearly	parties	state	their	positions	in	
thirteen	different	policy	areas	by	summing	the	number	of	positive	and	negative	towards	any	
of	 the	 thirteen	 areas	 in	 a	 given	 election.	 The	more	 unambiguously	 positive	 or	 negative	 a	
																																								 																				
11	 In	all	 three	parties,	 in	order	to	start	a	tribunal	case	the	 initiator	must	provide	the	following	 information	 in	
written	 form:	 (1)	 Name,	 address	 and	 further	 contact	 details	 of	 initiator,	 (2)	 Name	 and	 address	 of	 the	
defendant,	(3)	Clear,	unambiguous	claim	and	(4)	Reasons	for	the	initiative	including	a	description	of	the	events	
based	 on	which	 accusations	 are	made.	 Once	 the	 tribunal	 receives	 the	 claim	 it	 reviews	 the	 case	 and	 either	
accepts	it,	leading	to	a	hearing,	or	rejects	the	case	based	on	lack	of	merit	or	failure	to	comply	with	all	formal	
requirements.	In	case	of	rejection,	the	jury	is	required	to	send	all	participants	a	written	justification.	It	has	to	
include	the	following	information:	the	evidence	provided	related	to	the	case	and	a	justification	of	the	tribunal	
decision	with	 reference	 to	 the	same	evidence.	Further,	 it	needs	 to	 stress	 that	plaintiff	 can	appeal	 the	 initial	
rejection	if	they	wish	to	do	so.	
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party’s	election	manifesto	describes	a	particular	policy	position,	the	higher	their	index	score,	
which	varies	between	“0”	and	“1”.	The	weight	of	each	policy	area	in	the	index	derives	from	
the	number	of	statements	all	parties	dedicate	towards	 that	area	 in	a	given	election.12	We	
assign	the	value	from	the	latest	available	election	to	each	case.		
	
We	capture	the	governmental	dynamics	of	our	office	logic	with	two	dummy	variables:	first,	
Government	 Status	 (H3.1)	 distinguishes	 cases	 in	 parties	 in	 government	 (1)	 from	 those	 in	
opposition	 parties	 (0).	 Second,	Government	 Loss	 (H3.2)	 codes	 the	 first	 year	 after	 a	 party	
loses	governmental	power	as	(1)	and	the	remaining	years	as	(0).		
	
Our	first	control	variable	assesses	whether	the	case	brought	forward	was	an	appeal	or	not.	
Most	 initiators	 likely	 appeal	 after	 the	 party	 tribunals	 rejected	 their	 original	 cases	 due	 to	
technical	inadequacies,	and	we	thus	expect	a	higher	acceptance	rate	of	appeals.		
	
Second,	our	Subject	variable	controls	whether	the	case	covers	organizational	challenges	(1)	
or	membership	 expulsion	 (0).	 As	 the	 latter	 can	 be	 essential	 to	 sustain	 the	 organization’s	
integrity	and	is	less	costly	for	the	organization	to	implement	we	expect	that	organizational	
challenges	are	more	often	rejected	by	tribunals	(Cross	and	Katz	2013:	181).		
	
Third,	we	control	for	the	role	of	the	initiator	within	the	party.	Classical	works	predict	an	‘iron	
law	of	 oligarchy'	 (Michels	 1962:	 64,	 70;	Duverger	 1964)	 that	would	 seem	 to	 suggest	 that	
cases	 brought	 forward	 by	 party	 elites,	 that	 is	 public	 and	 party	 office-holders,	 should	 be	
more	 likely	 to	 get	 through	 the	 acceptance	 stage	 than	 cases	 initiated	 by	 rank	 and	 file	
members.		
	
Fourth,	we	include	the	parties’	ideological	left-right	position	using	the	rile	score	provided	by	
the	Comparative	Party	Manifesto	(CMP)	data	(Volkens	et	al	2016).	By	combining	scores	from	
																																								 																				
12	Thus,	even	if	a	party’s	manifesto	reaches	extreme	ambiguous	or	unambiguous	scores	in	a	policy	area,	but	
the	party	itself	and	other	parties	dedicate	little	attention	to	that	area	overall,	the	party’s	index	score	will	
hardly	be	affected.	
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different	 policy	 categories	 presented	 in	 the	 manifesto	 it	 provides	 an	 estimate	 of	 the	
ideological	 position	 of	 the	 party	 along	 a	 general	 left-right	 scale	 with	 a	 high	 and	 positive	
score	indicating	more	right-wing	parties	and	low	and	negative	score	more	left-wing	parties.	
As	already	outlined	the	formal	rules	regulating	tribunals	are	very	similar	across	parties	but	
case	 acceptance	 might	 also	 be	 influenced	 by	 party	 membership’s	 generalized	 values	
reflected	in	the	party’s	manifesto.	Tribunals	in	parties	on	the	ideological	left	should	accept	
more	cases	because	their	post-materialist	worldview	usually	suggests	openness	to	challenge	
authority.	 In	contrast,	tribunals	 in	more	conservative	and	traditional	parties	should	be	less	
likely	to	accept	cases.13		
	
Fifth,	party	age,	measured	in	years,	distinguishes	between	more	institutionalized	parties	and	
younger	ones	with	a	high	influx	of	new	members.	More	institutionalized	parties	can	afford	
to	accept	more	cases	as	they	pose	lower	threats	to	party	survival.	Finally,	we	control	for	the	
number	 of	 party	 members.	 Larger	 parties	 feature	 more	 members	 and	 more	 diverse	
opinions.	 They	may	 thus	 be	more	 selective	 in	which	 cases	 they	 accept	 than	 their	 smaller	
counterparts	as	the	overall	case	load	and	level	of	internal	disagreement	should	increase	as	
membership	 increases.	However	courts	only	have	a	 limited	capacity	 to	deal	with	cases	 so	
they	 will	 try	 to	 reduce	 the	 number	 of	 cases	 as	 much	 as	 possible	 by	 rejecting	 them.	We	
derive	membership	figures	from	the	MAPP	project	database	(Spier	2014).	We	log	both	party	
age	and	absolute	membership	size	as	these	variables	skew	strongly	to	the	right	side	of	the	
distribution.		
	
Our	online	appendix	includes	a	table	with	summary	statistics	and	the	bivariate	correlations	
between	all	explanatory	variables	in	our	data.	
	
	
																																								 																				
13	One	could	argue	that	while	 in	Western	European	post-materialist	parties	often	tend	to	the	economic	 left,	
more	traditional	positions	need	not	necessarily	be	placed	on	the	economic	right.	For	example	 liberal	parties	
with	economically	conservative	positions	 frequently	pursue	very	progressive	societal	polices.	Similarly,	 some	
left	parties,	especially	traditional	communist	parties,	might	be	societally	conservative.	In	order	to	capture	this	
we	also	ran	a	model	using	the	Society	(Progressive	-	Conservative)	variable	suggested	by	the	CMP	(see	table	5	
in	the	online	appendix).	The	variable	is	not	statistically	significant	and	does	not	affect	our	conclusions.	
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4.1	Overview	of	Tribunal	Cases		
	
Table	1	gives	an	overview	of	cases	submitted	by	party	since	1967	(introduction	of	party	law)	
or	since	their	formation,	 in	the	case	of	new	parties.	More	particularly,	 it	shows	how	many	
made	it	to	the	decision	stage.	
	
Table	1:	Tribunal	Decisions	in	German	Parties	
Party	
Name	
Period	
covered	
No.	of	Approval	
Stage	Cases	
No.	of	Decision	
Stage	Cases	
Share	of	Decision	
Stage	Cases	
CDU	 1967-2015	 329	 245	 74.47	
CSU	 1967-2015	 102	 72	 70.59	
FDP	 1967-2015	 98	 88	 89.80	
Greens	 1980-2015	 92	 76	 82.61	
Left	 2007-2015	 114	 75	 65.79	
SPD	 1967-2015	 353	 240	 67.99	
Total	 1967-2015	 1088	 796	 	
	
Figure	 1	 displays	 the	 acceptance	 rate	 over	 ten	 five-year	 periods	 by	 party.	 It	 becomes	
immediately	 apparent	 that	 our	 data	 do	 not	 only	 contain	 differences	 between	 parties	 but	
vary	 substantially	 over	 time.	 No	 consistent	 trend	 across	 parties	 emerges.	 Newly	 founded	
parties	such	as	the	Greens	and	the	Left	see	a	considerable	increase	in	the	number	of	cases	
accepted	by	their	tribunals	in	the	second	period	after	they	enter	our	sample.	Yet	we	see	a	
similar	uptick	 in	 the	 Social	Democrats’	 accepted	 cases	 in	 their	 second	period.	Clearly,	 the	
Social	Democrats	were	a	relatively	more	established	party	in	the	second	half	of	the	1970s.	
Moreover,	the	increase	in	accepted	cases	for	the	Greens	is	far	less	steep	than	the	increase	
for	Social	Democrats	and	the	Left.	In	contrast,	the	CDU,	the	CSU,	and	the	FDP	experience	far	
milder	changes	in	the	number	of	accepted	cases.	
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Figure	 1:	 Number	 of	 Accepted	 Cases	 by	 Party	 over	 Time
	
	
5.	Findings	
	
We	 estimate	 the	 likelihood	 of	 acceptance	 –	 or	 the	 inverse	 of	 rejection	 -	 by	 using	 a	 logit	
model	with	random	intercepts	 for	each	party.	As	Figure	1	revealed	substantial	differences	
between	parties,	the	random	intercepts	help	us	capture	residual	variance	not	picked	up	by	
our	 controls.14	 Overall,	 we	 find	 strong	 support	 for	 a	 systematic	 operation	 of	 the	 political	
logic	 in	 the	 acceptance	 stage	 of	 party	 tribunal	 cases	 in	 line	 with	 our	 theoretical	
expectations.	Table	2	displays	our	regression	models.	
	
Model	1	only	introduces	the	control	variables	(base	model),	while	Models	2-4	add	variables	
associated	with	 each	 of	 our	 hypotheses.	Model	 5	 combines	 all	 hypothesis	 tests	 into	 one	
model.	 In	 Models	 2-4,	 we	 find	 strong	 support	 for	 each	 of	 our	 vote,	 policy,	 and	 office	
arguments.	Tribunals	of	parties	 that	 lost	votes	 in	 the	 last	election	 tend	to	accept	a	higher	
share	of	cases	as	expected	by	H1.1.	Similarly,	tribunals	tend	to	reject	more	cases	as	election	
time	approaches	in	line	with	H1.2.	Turning	to	the	policy	logic,	tribunals	accept	fewer	cases	
when	 their	 parties’	 election	 manifesto	 displays	 greater	 policy	 agreement.	 Conversely,	
																																								 																				
14	We	also	tried	party	fixed	effects	models,	which	did	not	change	our	conclusions.	
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tribunals	 of	 parties	with	 high	 disagreement	 over	 important	 policies	 reject	 fewer	 cases	 as	
expected	 by	 H2	 (Model	 3).	 Regarding	 the	 office	 logic,	 we	 find	mixed	 results	 in	Model	 4.	
Parties	in	government	are	associated	with	a	greater	acceptance	rate,	or	lower	rejection	rate,	
of	 cases	 relative	 to	 opposition	 parties.	 While	 in	 line	 with	 our	 expectation	 in	 H3.1,	 the	
estimated	effect	 fails	 to	 reach	 conventional	 levels	 of	 statistical	 significance.	However,	 the	
office	logic	clearly	plays	out	in	the	context	of	H3.2.	as	tribunals	in	parties	that	recently	lost	
governmental	power	are	far	more	likely	to	accept	cases	than	parties	that	did	not	experience	
such	 a	 loss.	 Except	 for	 H3.1,	 our	 hypotheses	 receive	 support	 from	 the	 data	when	 tested	
separately	–	a	striking	result	considering	the	guidelines	set	out	in	the	German	Party	Law	and	
parties’	tight	regulations.		
	
Our	 integrated	Model	5	continues	to	 lend	credibility	 to	our	 theoretical	 rationale.	Only	 the	
estimated	effect	of	our	time	to	election	variable	drops	to	the	10%	level.	In	contrast,	policy	
agreement	 continues	 to	 be	 statistically	 significant	 at	 the	 5%	 level	 and	 vote	 loss	 even	
improves	 to	be	statistically	 significant	at	 the	1%	 level.	Given	 the	 theoretical	and	empirical	
overlap	 between	 vote	 losses	 and	 losing	 governmental	 power,	 it	 is	 remarkable	 that	 we	
continue	to	find	the	expected	effects	of	vote	losses	and	losing	governmental	power	in	the	
joint	 Model	 5.	 The	 result	 suggests	 an	 independent	 effect	 of	 recent	 electoral	
underperformance	even	for	parties	that	did	not	lose	office.		
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Table	2:	Hierarchical	Logit	Models	of	Case	Acceptance	(Rejection)	by	German	Party	Tribunals,	1967-
2015.		
DV:	Case	accepted	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	
Vote	Loss	 	 0.100**	
(0.041)	
	 	 0.116***		
(0.043)	
Time	to	Election	 	 0.037**	
(0.018)	
	 	 0.030*	
(0.018)	
Policy	Agreement	 	 	 -2.252**	
(1.076)	
	 -2.207**	
(1.092)	
Government	Party	 	 	 	 0.154	
(0.170)	
0.162		
(0.182)	
Government	Loss	(t-1)	 	 	 	 2.289**	
(1.027)	
2.115**	
(1.033)	
Appeal	 0.910***	
(0.181)	
0.854***	
(0.183)	
0.858***	
(0.183)	
0.873***	
(0.181)	
0.748***	
(0.187)	
Subject	Matter	 -0.513***	
(0.166)	
-0.521***	
(0.168)	
-0.516***	
(0.167)	
-0.532***	
(0.167)	
-0.548***	
(0.168)	
Initiator	 0.245	
(0.165)	
0.271	
(0.167)	
0.228	
(0.165)	
0.245	
(0.165)	
0.259	
(0.167)	
Ideology	(Left-Right)	 0.014***	
(0.004)	
0.014***	
(0.004)	
0.010**	
(0.004)	
0.013***	
(0.004)	
0.010**	
(0.005)	
Party	Age	(log)	 0.225**	
(0.113)	
0.151	
(0.116)	
0.131	
(0.121)	
0.169		
(0.118)	
-0.008	
(0.131)	
Membership	Size	(log)	 -0.538***	
(0.106)	
-0.522***	
(0.106)	
-0.451***	
(0.112)	
-0.518***	
(0.107)	
-0.408***	
(0.116)	
Constant	 6.659***	
(1.074)	
6.372***	
(1.075)	
7.743***	
(1.244)	
6.529***	
(1.087)	
7.272***	
(1.225)	
Observations	 1,045	 1,044	 1,044	 1,045	 1,044	
Variance	(Party	RE)	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Log	Likelihood	 -565.814	 -559.115	 -562.326	 -560.697	 -552.315	
AIC	 1,147.628	 1,138.230	 1,142.653	 1,141.395	 1,130.629	
*p<0.1;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01;	Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	
	
The	 estimates	 of	 our	 controls	 reveal	 mixed	 results.	 In	 line	 with	 existing	 expectations,	
appeals	are	more	likely	to	make	it	through	the	approval	stage,	as	are	cases	of	membership	
expulsion	(the	baseline	category	in	the	subject	variable).15	The	estimated	effect	of	party	left-
																																								 																				
15	We	also	tested	whether	our	strategic	logic	differs	for	organizational	challenges	over	membership	
expulsions	 by	 interacting	 each	 of	 our	 main	 explanatory	 variables	 with	 the	 subject	 dummy.	 We	
estimated	 likelihood	 ratio	 tests	 by	 comparing	 the	 interaction	 models,	 reported	 in	 the	 online	
appendix,	and	the	simpler	models	reported	in	Table	2.	On	the	basis	of	these	tests,	we	conclude	that	
our	hypotheses	have	similar	effects	in	organizational	and	expulsion	cases.	
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right	positions	is	positive	and	statistically	significant	across	all	our	specifications.	This	rather	
counterintuitive	 result	 suggests	 that	more	conservative	parties	 tend	 to	accept	cases	more	
easily	than	progressive	ones,	or	vice	versa,	that	courts	 in	more	progressive	parties	tend	to	
reject	cases	more	easily	than	conservative	ones.	Possibly,	conservative	parties	do	not	only	
propagate	 law	 and	 order	 in	 their	 policies	 but	 also	 respect	 these	 values	 in	 the	 intra-party	
arena	 allowing	 for	 case	 to	 be	 heard.	 Additionally,	 tribunals	 of	 larger	 parties	 consistently	
seem	to	accept	cases	at	lower	rates	than	tribunals	of	smaller	parties.	Although	party	elites	
have	 a	 slightly	 higher	 likelihood	 of	 seeing	 their	 cases	 accepted	we	 cannot	 reject	 the	 null	
hypothesis	of	no	difference	between	elites	and	normal	party	members.	The	effect	of	party	
age	 is	 inconsistent.	 In	 only	 one	 out	 of	 five	 specifications	 is	 the	 estimate	 of	 party	 age	
positively	 and	 statistically	 significantly	 related	 to	 higher	 rates	 of	 acceptance,	 and	 thus	
negatively	 related	 to	 rejections.	 Yet	 it	 in	 the	 remaining	 models	 it	 is	 not	 statistically	
significant	 and	 suggests	 that	 younger	 parties	 tend	 to	 reject	 fewer	 cases	 in	 Model	 5.	
Importantly,	our	variables	pick	up	all	 relevant	differences	between	parties.	The	estimated	
variance	 of	 the	 party	 random	 effects	 is	 consistently	 zero.	 In	 fact,	 regular	 logit	 models	
without	random	effects	return	the	same	results	(see	Table	4	in	the	online	appendix).	
	 	
19		
Figure	2:	Predicted	changes	in	probability	of	case	acceptance/rejection		
	
	
	
Having	 discussed	 the	 general	 direction	 of	 our	 predicted	 effects,	 we	 now	 present	 their	
estimated	 substantive	 size.	 Figure	 2	 portrays	 the	 predicted	 change	 in	 probability	 of	 case	
acceptance	 (rejection)	when	moving	 the	 respective	 variable	 from	 one	 standard	 deviation	
below	its	mean	to	one	standard	deviation	above	its	mean	while	holding	all	other	variables	at	
their	means	or	modes.	 In	the	case	of	our	two	categorical	variables,	government	party	and	
loss,	we	change	their	value	from	0	to	1.	The	Figure	compares	the	effects	from	Models	2-4	to	
the	joint	model	(5)	for	each	explanatory	variable.		
	
Losing	four	percentage	points	in	vote	shares	relative	to	the	last	election,	increases	the	case	
acceptance	rate	by	about	ten	percentage	points.	Similarly,	increasing	the	time	until	the	next	
election	 from	 a	 little	 below	 a	 year	 to	 about	 three	 years,	 increases	 the	 likelihood	 of	 case	
acceptance	by	about	5	percentage	points.	Moving	from	a	party	with	low	to	one	with	a	high	
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programmatic	 coherence	 results	 in	 a	 ten-percentage	 point	 decrease	 in	 the	 likelihood	 of	
accepting	a	case.	Participating	in	government	has	only	a	negligible	effect	on	the	likelihood	of	
case	 acceptance	 and	 even	 approaches	 zero	 in	 Model	 5.	 In	 contrast,	 losing	 access	 to	
governmental	office	clearly	exerts	the	strongest	effect	among	our	explanatory	variables	and	
increases	the	probability	of	case	acceptance	by	about	20	percentage	points.		
	
To	 put	 these	 numbers	 into	 context,	 consider	 the	 CDU	 before	 and	 after	 the	 1998	 federal	
elections.	Helmut	Kohl	and	his	party	suffered	a	6.3	percentage	point	decrease	in	vote	share	
and	 lost	 government	power.	Our	model	 thus	 predicts	 that	 the	number	of	 accepted	 cases	
should	rise	by	a	factor	of	1.35	from	1997/1998	to	1999/2000.16	An	additional	five-per	cent	
increase	is	predicted	because	we	move	from	a	time	close	to	the	election	to	a	year	in	which	
the	next	election	is	still	years	away	but	the	time	to	election	effect	is	offset	by	the	CDU’s	new	
status	 as	 an	 opposition	 party,	 which	 accepts	 fewer	 cases	 than	 government	 parties.	
Effectively,	our	model	points	 in	 the	 right	direction	but	overpredicts	 the	actual	 increase	as	
the	observed	rate	of	accepted	cases	rises	from	82%	in	1997/1998	to	93%	in	1999/2000,	an	
increase	 of	 only	 13%.	When	we	 compare	 the	 full	 legislative	 periods	 from	 1995-1998	 and	
1999	 to	 2002,	 our	 model	 predicts	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 acceptance	 rate	 by	 30%	 as	 the	
decreasing	 effect	 of	 time	 to	 election	 averages	 out.	 We	 observe	 that	 the	 CDU	 tribunals	
accepted	almost	19%	more	cases	after	1998	than	in	the	four	years	up	to	the	election.		
		
In	essence,	our	findings	suggest	that	strategic	considerations	related	to	parties’	attempts	to	
achieve	central	goals	–votes,	policy,	and	office	-	affect	whether	tribunals	are	 likely	to	deal	
with	instances	of	conflict	and	decide	on	them	or	avoid	making	decisions	on	them	altogether.	
	
Conclusions	
	
The	 paper	 explores	 theorizes	 and	 empirically	 examines	 how	 political	 dynamics	 affect	
political	 parties’	 internal	 conflict	 regulation	 mechanisms	 and	 thereby	 contributes	 to	 a	
growing	 literature	on	 intra-party	 conflict,	 that	 -	 to	date	 -	has	been	primarily	 interested	 in	
																																								 																				
16		The	prediction	consists	of	a	15%-increase	from	losing	6%	of	the	vote	share	and	a	20%	increase	
from	losing	government	power.		
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how	parties	resolve	conflict	in	particular	areas	(e.g.	in	government	coalitions),	of	a	particular	
type	 (e.g.	 factionalism)	 or	 within	 particular	 parties	 (e.g.	 new	 parties)	 (e.g.	 Boucek	 2009;	
2012;	Bäck	2008;	Deschouwer	2008;	Giannetti	and	Benoit	2008;	Maor	1992;	Scarrow	2005;	
Seeleib-Kaiser	 2010).	 Day-to-day	 mechanisms	 of	 conflict	 regulation	 and	 their	 working	 –	
processes	that	tend	to	be	hidden	-	have	received	much	less	attention	though	case	studies	of	
party	 decline	 and	 disintegration	 suggest	 their	 importance	 for	 assuring	 the	 on-going	
functioning	 of	 parties	 (e.g.	 de	 Lange	 and	 Art	 2011;	 Bolleyer	 2013;	 Bolleyer	 et	 al	 2017).	
Building	 on	 the	 literature	 of	 politicization	 in	 public	 court	 systems,	 we	 propose	 a	 new	
theoretical	framework	on	the	operation	of	intra-party	tribunals	centered	on	the	core	party	
goals	 of	 vote	 maximization,	 policy	 implementation	 and	 office	 holding	 (Müller	 and	 Strøm	
1999),	and	derive	five	hypotheses	on	the	acceptance	and	rejection	of	cases,	which	we	test	
against	 novel	 case	 data	 from	 the	 highly	 regulated	 and	 legalistic	 German	 party	 tribunal	
system	between	1967	and	today.		
	
Our	 empirical	 analysis	 supports	 our	 conjectures	 that	 tribunals	more	 easily	 approve	 cases	
after	 lost	 of	 votes	 (H1.1)	 and	 tend	 to	 accept	 fewer	 cases	 as	 federal	 elections	 approach	
(H1.2).	 Further	 tribunals	 in	 ideologically	 highly	 coherent	 parties	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 accept	
cases	 submitted	 to	 them	 (H	2)	 and	 tribunals	more	 easily	 approve	 cases	 after	 a	 party	 lost	
government	 office	 (H3.2).	 Finally,	 we	 reject	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 tribunals	 of	 government	
parties	tend	to	accept	fewer	cases	than	their	opposition	counterparts.		
In	 sum,	 these	 findings	 suggest	 that	 strategic	 considerations	 related	 to	 parties’	
attempts	 to	 achieve	 their	 central	 goals	 –votes,	 policy	 and	office-	 affect	whether	 tribunals	
accept	 cases	 or	 not.	 In	 line	 with	 the	 existing	 literature	 (Müller	 and	 Strøm	 1999)	 we	 find	
party	 tribunals	 to	 be	 influenced	 by	 all	 three	 party	 goals	 rather	 than	 any	 specific	 one.	
Moreover,	our	findings	indicate	that	the	formal	requirements	that	dictate	political	neutrality	
have	little	bite.	This	is	a	striking	result	given	that	the	leeway	for	tribunals	to	reject	cases	for	
reasons	other	than	procedural	violations	should	not	exist.	Thus	despite	the	high	legalization	
of	intra-party	conflict	regulation	in	German	parties,	political	pressures	and	parties'	strategic	
considerations	as	 theorized	above	 still	 play	a	 role	 in	whether	or	not	 tribunals	deal	with	a	
conflict	in	the	first	place	or	not.		
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More	broadly	speaking	our	findings	further	highlight	the	importance	of	political	dynamics	in	
the	working	of	party	conflict	regulation	and	stress	that	the	politicization	of	party	tribunals	
should	not	be	underestimated,	even	when	party	procedures	replicate	rule	of	law	standards	
as	 they	have	 to	under	German	party	 law.	 To	put	 our	 findings	 on	 a	more	 general	 footing,	
future	 research	 could	 apply	 our	 theoretical	 argument	 more	 broadly	 and	 test	 it	 in	 legal	
settings	 that	 also	 legally	 require	 internal	 party	 tribunals,	 for	 example	 Czech	 Republic,	
Romania	 and	 Portugal	 (Biezen	 and	 Piccio	 2013),	 as	 well	 as	 parties	 that	 have	 introduced	
independent	tribunals	voluntary	such	as	the	Liberal	Democrats	or	Greens	in	the	UK	(Bolleyer	
et	 al	 2018).	 	More	 specifically,	 future	 research	 should	 also	 focus	 on	 how	 to	 improve	 the	
neutrality	requirement	within	parties	or	more	clearly	set	out	the	limits	of	such	an	approach.	
This	 leads	 to	 important	 normative	 questions	 raised	 by	 our	 findings	 that	 challenge	 the	
political	neutrality	of	the	tribunals.	As	stressed	earlier	the	ability	of	parties	to	manage	and	
ultimately	resolve	internal	conflict	is	not	only	vital	for	their	organizational	survival	but	also	
to	 achieve	 their	 functions	 within	 the	 political	 system.	 Here	 the	 tribunals	 can	 make	 a	
substantial	contribution.	However	the	political	 logic	adopted	by	tribunals	also	entails	clear	
risks.	Therefore	we	need	to	ask	to	what	extent	it	 is	possible	to	effectively	transplant	court	
structures	 into	 an	 organizational	 setting	 and	 tribunals’	 ability	 to	 enhance	 intra-party	
democracy	and	electoral	fortunes	of	parties,	two	goals	that	are	often	difficult	to	reconcile.	
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